"In Europa ci sono già i presupposti per l'esplosione di un conflitto sociale. Questo è il seme del malcontento, dell'egoismo e della disperazione che la classe politica e la classe dirigente hanno sparso. Questo è terreno fertile per la xenofobia, la violenza, il terrorismo interno, il successo del populismo e dell'estremismo politico."

venerdì 26 novembre 2021

I retroscena sul caso TIM-KKR: Prysmiangroup, la fibra ottica e l'arsenale di armi informatiche della CIA

"Vault 7": CIA Hacking Tools Revealed

 



Press Release

 

Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named "Vault 7" by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency.

The first full part of the series, "Year Zero", comprises 8,761 documents and files from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence in Langley, Virgina. It follows an introductory disclosure last month of CIA targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012 presidential election.

Recently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized "zero day" exploits, malware remote control systems and associated documentation. This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive.

 

"Year Zero" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of "zero day" weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include Apple's iPhone, Google's Android and Microsoft's Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into covert microphones.

Since 2001 the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA found itself building not just its now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of covert, globe-spanning force — its own substantial fleet of hackers. The agency's hacking division freed it from having to disclose its often controversial operations to the NSA (its primary bureaucratic rival) in order to draw on the NSA's hacking capacities.

 

By the end of 2016, the CIA's hacking division, which formally falls under the agency's Center for Cyber Intelligence (CCI), had over 5000 registered users and had produced more than a thousand hacking systems, trojans, viruses, and other "weaponized" malware. Such is the scale of the CIA's undertaking that by 2016, its hackers had utilized more code than that used to run Facebook. The CIA had created, in effect, its "own NSA" with even less accountability and without publicly answering the question as to whether such a massive budgetary spend on duplicating the capacities of a rival agency could be justified.

In a statement to WikiLeaks the source details policy questions that they say urgently need to be debated in public, including whether the CIA's hacking capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the problem of public oversight of the agency. The source wishes to initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use, proliferation and democratic control of cyberweapons.

Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by rival states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.

 

Julian Assange, WikiLeaks editor stated that "There is an extreme proliferation risk in the development of cyber 'weapons'. Comparisons can be drawn between the uncontrolled proliferation of such 'weapons', which results from the inability to contain them combined with their high market value, and the global arms trade. But the significance of "Year Zero" goes well beyond the choice between cyberwar and cyberpeace. The disclosure is also exceptional from a political, legal and forensic perspective."

Wikileaks has carefully reviewed the "Year Zero" disclosure and published substantive CIA documentation while avoiding the distribution of 'armed' cyberweapons until a consensus emerges on the technical and political nature of the CIA's program and how such 'weapons' should analyzed, disarmed and published.

Wikileaks has also decided to redact and anonymise some identifying information in "Year Zero" for in depth analysis. These redactions include ten of thousands of CIA targets and attack machines throughout Latin America, Europe and the United States. While we are aware of the imperfect results of any approach chosen, we remain committed to our publishing model and note that the quantity of published pages in "Vault 7" part one (“Year Zero”) already eclipses the total number of pages published over the first three years of the Edward Snowden NSA leaks.

 

Analysis

 

CIA malware targets iPhone, Android, smart TVs

CIA malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development Group), a software development group within CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA's DDI (Directorate for Digital Innovation). The DDI is one of the five major directorates of the CIA (see this organizational chart of the CIA for more details).

The EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational support of all backdoors, exploits, malicious payloads, trojans, viruses and any other kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert operations world-wide.

The increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn comparisons with George Orwell's 1984, but "Weeping Angel", developed by the CIA's Embedded Devices Branch (EDB), which infests smart TVs, transforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic realization.

The attack against Samsung smart TVs was developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom's MI5/BTSS. After infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a 'Fake-Off' mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on. In 'Fake-Off' mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server. 

As of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and trucks. The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations.

 

The CIA's Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to remotely hack and control popular smart phones. Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user's geolocation, audio and text communications as well as covertly activate the phone's camera and microphone.

Despite iPhone's minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in 2016, a specialized unit in the CIA's Mobile Development Branch produces malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones and other Apple products running iOS, such as iPads. CIA's arsenal includes numerous local and remote "zero days" developed by CIA or obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms contractors such as Baitshop. The disproportionate focus on iOS may be explained by the popularity of the iPhone among social, political, diplomatic and business elites.

A similar unit targets Google's Android which is used to run the majority of the world's smart phones (~85%) including Samsung, HTC and Sony. 1.15 billion Android powered phones were sold last year. "Year Zero" shows that as of 2016 the CIA had 24 "weaponized" Android "zero days" which it has developed itself and obtained from GCHQ, NSA and cyber arms contractors.

These techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, Wiebo, Confide and Cloackman by hacking the "smart" phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic before encryption is applied.

 

CIA malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux, routers

The CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with its malware. This includes multiple local and remote weaponized "zero days", air gap jumping viruses such as "Hammer Drill" which infects software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors for removable media such as USBs, systems to hide data in images or in covert disk areas ( "Brutal Kangaroo") and to keep its malware infestations going.

Many of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA's Automated Implant Branch (AIB), which has developed several attack systems for automated infestation and control of CIA malware, such as "Assassin" and "Medusa".

Attacks against Internet infrastructure and webservers are developed by the CIA's Network Devices Branch (NDB).

The CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control systems covering Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as EDB's "HIVE" and the related "Cutthroat" and "Swindle" tools, which are described in the examples section below.

 

CIA 'hoarded' vulnerabilities ("zero days")

In the wake of Edward Snowden's leaks about the NSA, the U.S. technology industry secured a commitment from the Obama administration that the executive would disclose on an ongoing basis — rather than hoard — serious vulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or "zero days" to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and other US-based manufacturers.

Serious vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge swathes of the population and critical infrastructure at risk to foreign intelligence or cyber criminals who independently discover or hear rumors of the vulnerability. If the CIA can discover such vulnerabilities so can others.

The U.S. government's commitment to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process came after significant lobbying by US technology companies, who risk losing their share of the global market over real and perceived hidden vulnerabilities. The government stated that it would disclose all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on an ongoing basis.

"Year Zero" documents show that the CIA breached the Obama administration's commitments. Many of the vulnerabilities used in the CIA's cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have been found by rival intelligence agencies or cyber criminals.

As an example, specific CIA malware revealed in "Year Zero" is able to penetrate, infest and control both the Android phone and iPhone software that runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts. The CIA attacks this software by using undisclosed security vulnerabilities ("zero days") possessed by the CIA but if the CIA can hack these phones then so can everyone else who has obtained or discovered the vulnerability. As long as the CIA keeps these vulnerabilities concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they will not be fixed, and the phones will remain hackable.

The same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the U.S. Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system administrators, security officers and engineers. By hiding these security flaws from manufacturers like Apple and Google the CIA ensures that it can hack everyone &mdsh; at the expense of leaving everyone hackable.

 

'Cyberwar' programs are a serious proliferation risk

Cyber 'weapons' are not possible to keep under effective control.

While nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and visible infrastructure involved in assembling enough fissile material to produce a critical nuclear mass, cyber 'weapons', once developed, are very hard to retain.

Cyber 'weapons' are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated like any other. Since they are entirely comprised of information they can be copied quickly with no marginal cost.

Securing such 'weapons' is particularly difficult since the same people who develop and use them have the skills to exfiltrate copies without leaving traces — sometimes by using the very same 'weapons' against the organizations that contain them. There are substantial price incentives for government hackers and consultants to obtain copies since there is a global "vulnerability market" that will pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies of such 'weapons'. Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such 'weapons' sometimes use them for their own purposes, obtaining advantage over their competitors in selling 'hacking' services.

Over the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which consists of government agencies such as the CIA and NSA and their contractors, such as Booz Allan Hamilton, has been subject to unprecedented series of data exfiltrations by its own workers.

A number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have been arrested or subject to federal criminal investigations in separate incidents.

Most visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Harold T. Martin III with 20 counts of mishandling classified information. The Department of Justice alleged that it seized some 50,000 gigabytes of information from Harold T. Martin III that he had obtained from classified programs at NSA and CIA, including the source code for numerous hacking tools.

Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.

 

U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt is a covert CIA hacker base

In addition to its operations in Langley, Virginia the CIA also uses the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt as a covert base for its hackers covering Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

CIA hackers operating out of the Frankfurt consulate ( "Center for Cyber Intelligence Europe" or CCIE) are given diplomatic ("black") passports and State Department cover. The instructions for incoming CIA hackers make Germany's counter-intelligence efforts appear inconsequential: "Breeze through German Customs because you have your cover-for-action story down pat, and all they did was stamp your passport"

Your Cover Story (for this trip)
Q: Why are you here?
A: Supporting technical consultations at the Consulate.

Two earlier WikiLeaks publications give further detail on CIA approaches to customs and secondary screening procedures.

Once in Frankfurt CIA hackers can travel without further border checks to the 25 European countries that are part of the Shengen open border area — including France, Italy and Switzerland.

A number of the CIA's electronic attack methods are designed for physical proximity. These attack methods are able to penetrate high security networks that are disconnected from the internet, such as police record database. In these cases, a CIA officer, agent or allied intelligence officer acting under instructions, physically infiltrates the targeted workplace. The attacker is provided with a USB containing malware developed for the CIA for this purpose, which is inserted into the targeted computer. The attacker then infects and exfiltrates data to removable media. For example, the CIA attack system Fine Dining, provides 24 decoy applications for CIA spies to use. To witnesses, the spy appears to be running a program showing videos (e.g VLC), presenting slides (Prezi), playing a computer game (Breakout2, 2048) or even running a fake virus scanner (Kaspersky, McAfee, Sophos). But while the decoy application is on the screen, the underlaying system is automatically infected and ransacked.

 

How the CIA dramatically increased proliferation risks

In what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that for the most market valuable part of "Vault 7" — the CIA's weaponized malware (implants + zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and Command and Control (C2) systems — the agency has little legal recourse.

The CIA made these systems unclassified.

Why the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the 'battlefield' of cyber 'war'.

To attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate with their control programs over the internet. If CIA implants, Command & Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying/war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution. This means that cyber 'arms' manufactures and computer hackers can freely "pirate" these 'weapons' if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on obfuscation to protect its malware secrets.

Conventional weapons such as missiles may be fired at the enemy (i.e into an unsecured area). Proximity to or impact with the target detonates the ordnance including its classified parts. Hence military personnel do not violate classification rules by firing ordnance with classified parts. Ordnance will likely explode. If it does not, that is not the operator's intent.

Over the last decade U.S. hacking operations have been increasingly dressed up in military jargon to tap into Department of Defense funding streams. For instance, attempted "malware injections" (commercial jargon) or "implant drops" (NSA jargon) are being called "fires" as if a weapon was being fired. However the analogy is questionable.

Unlike bullets, bombs or missiles, most CIA malware is designed to live for days or even years after it has reached its 'target'. CIA malware does not "explode on impact" but rather permanently infests its target. In order to infect target's device, copies of the malware must be placed on the target's devices, giving physical possession of the malware to the target. To exfiltrate data back to the CIA or to await further instructions the malware must communicate with CIA Command & Control (C2) systems placed on internet connected servers. But such servers are typically not approved to hold classified information, so CIA command and control systems are also made unclassified.

A successful 'attack' on a target's computer system is more like a series of complex stock maneuvers in a hostile take-over bid or the careful planting of rumors in order to gain control over an organization's leadership rather than the firing of a weapons system. If there is a military analogy to be made, the infestation of a target is perhaps akin to the execution of a whole series of military maneuvers against the target's territory including observation, infiltration, occupation and exploitation.

 

Evading forensics and anti-virus

A series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which are likely to assist forensic crime scene investigators as well as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Nokia, Blackberry, Siemens and anti-virus companies attribute and defend against attacks.

"Tradecraft DO's and DON'Ts" contains CIA rules on how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints implicating the "CIA, US government, or its witting partner companies" in "forensic review". Similar secret standards cover the use of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware communication (pdf), describing targets & exfiltrated data (pdf) as well as executing payloads (pdf) and persisting (pdf) in the target's machines over time.

CIA hackers developed successful attacks against most well known anti-virus programs. These are documented in AV defeats, Personal Security Products, Detecting and defeating PSPs and PSP/Debugger/RE Avoidance. For example, Comodo was defeated by CIA malware placing itself in the Window's "Recycle Bin". While Comodo 6.x has a "Gaping Hole of DOOM".

CIA hackers discussed what the NSA's "Equation Group" hackers did wrong and how the CIA's malware makers could avoid similar exposure.

 

Examples

 

The CIA's Engineering Development Group (EDG) management system contains around 500 different projects (only some of which are documented by "Year Zero") each with their own sub-projects, malware and hacker tools.

The majority of these projects relate to tools that are used for penetration, infestation ("implanting"), control, and exfiltration.

Another branch of development focuses on the development and operation of Listening Posts (LP) and Command and Control (C2) systems used to communicate with and control CIA implants; special projects are used to target specific hardware from routers to smart TVs.

Some example projects are described below, but see the table of contents for the full list of projects described by WikiLeaks' "Year Zero".

 

UMBRAGE

The CIA's hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the agency. Each technique it has created forms a "fingerprint" that can be used by forensic investigators to attribute multiple different attacks to the same entity.

This is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple separate murder victims. The unique wounding style creates suspicion that a single murderer is responsible. As soon one murder in the set is solved then the other murders also find likely attribution.

The CIA's Remote Devices Branch's UMBRAGE group collects and maintains a substantial library of attack techniques 'stolen' from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation.

With UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving behind the "fingerprints" of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen from.

UMBRAGE components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam capture, data destruction, persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, anti-virus (PSP) avoidance and survey techniques.

 

Fine Dining

Fine Dining comes with a standardized questionnaire i.e menu that CIA case officers fill out. The questionnaire is used by the agency's OSB (Operational Support Branch) to transform the requests of case officers into technical requirements for hacking attacks (typically "exfiltrating" information from computer systems) for specific operations. The questionnaire allows the OSB to identify how to adapt existing tools for the operation, and communicate this to CIA malware configuration staff. The OSB functions as the interface between CIA operational staff and the relevant technical support staff.

Among the list of possible targets of the collection are 'Asset', 'Liason Asset', 'System Administrator', 'Foreign Information Operations', 'Foreign Intelligence Agencies' and 'Foreign Government Entities'. Notably absent is any reference to extremists or transnational criminals. The 'Case Officer' is also asked to specify the environment of the target like the type of computer, operating system used, Internet connectivity and installed anti-virus utilities (PSPs) as well as a list of file types to be exfiltrated like Office documents, audio, video, images or custom file types. The 'menu' also asks for information if recurring access to the target is possible and how long unobserved access to the computer can be maintained. This information is used by the CIA's 'JQJIMPROVISE' software (see below) to configure a set of CIA malware suited to the specific needs of an operation.

 

Improvise (JQJIMPROVISE)

'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). Its configuration utilities like Margarita allows the NOC (Network Operation Center) to customize tools based on requirements from 'Fine Dining' questionairies.

 

HIVE

HIVE is a multi-platform CIA malware suite and its associated control software. The project provides customizable implants for Windows, Solaris, MikroTik (used in internet routers) and Linux platforms and a Listening Post (LP)/Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to communicate with these implants.

The implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver of a cover domain; each operation utilizing these implants has a separate cover domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of cover domains.

Each cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a commercial VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider. The public-facing server forwards all incoming traffic via a VPN to a 'Blot' server that handles actual connection requests from clients. It is setup for optional SSL client authentication: if a client sends a valid client certificate (only implants can do that), the connection is forwarded to the 'Honeycomb' toolserver that communicates with the implant; if a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries to open the cover domain website by accident), the traffic is forwarded to a cover server that delivers an unsuspicious looking website.

The Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant; an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the implant.

Similar functionality (though limited to Windows) is provided by the RickBobby project.

See the classified user and developer guides for HIVE.

 

 

 

Link originale: https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/?fbclid=IwAR1BOSXfBtP5QksvivdtdpS1ccR4JBZZOkFLB5zBRhuKVQnwoWhLN9MCu4Q

lunedì 22 novembre 2021

Una videorecensione di "UROPIA il protocollo Maynards" del Professore-Youtuber Simone Bulleri

Simone Bulleri (YouTube) Videorecensione di UROPIA- il protocollo Maynards

di Pietro Bargagli Stoffi, thriller distopico (edizioni Bibliotheka, 2019)





Postiamo volentieri una approfondita e sofisticata videorecensione dello youtuber Simone Bulleri, pubblicata dal Professore toscano sul suo gradevole canale dove conversa di storia, filosofia, letteratura e cinema con competenza e piacevolezza, condividendo spesso con i followers le sue doti attoriali coltivate in anni e anni di teatro.

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yoex26KBIv0&t=14s




lunedì 1 novembre 2021

Aggiornamenti sul leak di chiavi digitali dei Greenpass EU

EU’s Green Pass Vaccination ID Private Key Leaked: updates



threatPost - Author: Lisa Vaas - October 28, 2021 11:34 am

 

UPDATE: French & Polish authorities found no sign of cryptographic compromise in the leak of the private key used to sign the vaccine passports and to create fake passes for Mickey Mouse and Adolf Hitler, et al.

As of Thursday morning Eastern time, Adolf Hitler and Mickey Mouse could still validate their digital Covid passes, SpongeBob Squarepants was out of luck, and the European Union was investigating a leak of the private key used to sign the EU’s Green Pass vaccine passports.

Two days earlier, on Tuesday, several people reported that they’d found a QR code online that turned out to be a digital Covid certificate with the name “Adolf Hitler” written on it, along with a date of birth listed as Jan. 1, 1900.

On Wednesday, the Italian news agency ANSA reported that several underground vendors were selling passes signed with the stolen key on the Dark Web, and that the EU had called “several high-level meetings” to investigate whether the theft was an isolated incident.

The private key used to verify Hitler’s pass was reportedly revoked as of Wednesday, but there were multiple reports of working certificates still being sold online. Threatpost confirmed this on Thursday morning by using the official Verifica C19 app to scan a QR code that had been shared on Twitter by a penetration tester.

 

Try to scan this QR code with the official government APP "Verifica C19"

2/3 pic.twitter.com/2y65c4vsc9

— reversebrain (@reversebrain) October 26, 2021

 

Adolf’s certificate got the green light, as shown in the screen capture below:




Other QR codes posted to GitHub turned up a validly signed certificate for Mickey Mouse, though SpongeBob’s certificate has since been turned away as the key(s) gets revoked.

 



As of Thursday, the certificate for Adolf Hitler was also still being accepted by Germany’s Covid app “CovPass,” where the private certificate itself appears to originate from France.

 

Serious Repercussions of a Leaked Private Certificate

 

Dirk Schrader, global vice president of security research at New Net Technologies (NNT), now part of change management software provider Netwrix, told Threatpost on Thursday that this leak is likely going to be a big issue as travelers increasing require proof of vaccination.

“A leaked private certificate is a likely a big issue as other nations, specially non-EU nations, might require additional proof for any traveler, once the full scope of this incident unfolds,” he said via email. “The market for such fake vaccination certificates seems to be promising, as the use of Mickey Mouse and other fictitious and historic names certainly is used as a proof and assurance for potential buyers.”

 

Authentic EU Digital Passports Could Be Invalidated

 

The worst potential outcome of this, Schrader pointed out, would be revocation of that private key – an outcome that could  affect 278 million EU citizens.

Joseph Carson, chief security scientist and Advisory CISO at ThycoticCentrify, a Washington D.C. based provider of cloud identity security solutions, said the news of the leak is “shocking,”

“It is a major concern that the private keys have been reportedly leaked/sold and actively being used to create forged EU Digital COVID passports,” he told Threatpost on Thursday. “This leak could, in fact, invalidate existing authentic EU Digital Passports unless a full incident response and root cause analysis is determined that could minimize any potential damage this could cause.”

Carson pointed out that aach country is responsible for their private keys, so one country being compromised “would not be a major surprise.”

That, however, isn’t the case: multiple countries are being reported, which is going to damage the trust that the EU Digital Passport provides and which “could force a revamp on travel restrictions or trust in the passport,” Carson said.

“The whole trust is based on keeping those private keys secured and protected, and I just hope that the impacted countries have minimized the risks and [are] not dependent on a single set of private keys for all EU Digital Passports,” he continued.

“[Determining] how the private keys have been compromised should be a top priority,” while reducing the risks of such a leak reoccurring should mean that security and protection of the keys will be significantly improved, he said.

 

A ‘Growing Black Market’ in Forged Vaccine Passports

 

Besides fictional or dead characters, the penetration tester who shared the QR code – @reversebrain – noted that this is no laughing matter. “This is worrying,” they said. “If the leak would be confirmed, this means that fake EU Digital COVID Certificate can be forged to any person.”

It wouldn’t be the first time. In June, Germany set up a police task force to battle what the BBC called a growing black market in forged vaccine certificates, as scammers communicated via the encrypted Telegram messaging service to dupe people into paying about €100 (£86; $122) for a whole lot of nothing.

Telegram is again featuring in the forged certificates this time around. GitHub user Emanuele Laface said on Tuesday that the encrypted messenger service is where most of the forged Green Passes are being passed around:

“On various groups (Telegram mainly) are circulating several forged Green Pass with valid signature.” —Emanuele Laface’s Oct. 26 GitHub post

Laface suggested that the leak could encompass more than just one private key. Rather, it could be  that a database of private keys was compromised: a possibility that “may [end] up in a break of the chain of trust in the Green Pass architecture,” they noted.

That chain of trust could be broken in a lot of places: According to BleepngComputer, the fake certificates circulating online have been issued from countries including France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, and more, “indicating the issue could very well impact the entire EU.”

 

EU (Slowly) Moves to Block Bogus Certificates

 

102821 13:05 UPDATE: The European Commission told Threatpost on Thursday that it’s in contact with the relevant Member States authorities that are investigating and which are putting remedial actions in place.

A spokesperson said that Member States in the eHealth Network decided on Wednesday to coordinate their actions on the incident. As a first step, he said, “Member States have agreed to block the two fraudulent certificates so that they will be shown as invalid by the verifying apps.”

The Commission didn’t give a timeline for when the certificates will be blocked, nor why Threatpost and others could still validate some of the bogus certificates on Thursday. 

But the Commission did say that Member States and the Commission are working at the national and European level on improving invalidation and revocation systems, “to be able to react to any such cases even more quickly.” 

The Commission condemned the private key theft: “The Member States and the Commission condemn this malicious act in the strongest possible terms, which comes at a time when health services in all Member States are under pressure fighting the pandemic.”

 

Cryptographic Keys Not Compromised

 

The Commission’s statement said that  the certificates were apparently generated “by persons with valid credentials to access the national IT systems, or a person misusing such valid credentials.” 

An investigation now being conducted by authorities in France and Poland is looking into possible causes of the fraudulent activity, including potential forgery of documents and identity theft. 

At this point, the investigation has ruled out a compromise of the cryptographic keys used to sign certificates, according to the Commission:

“According to the information available, the cryptographic keys used to sign certificates have not been compromised. This incident is caused by an illegal activity and not by a technical failure. Together with the Member States, we reaffirm our full trust in the EU Digital COVID Certificate system.”

 

102821 13:23 UPDATE: Added input from the European Commission.

102821 13:39 UPDATE 2: Added input from Dirk Schrader, Joseph Carson.

 

 

 

Link originale: https://threatpost.com/eus-green-pass-vaccination-id-private-key-leaked/175857/

venerdì 15 ottobre 2021

La proposta di legge UE violerebbe la privacy dei dati, dicono gli esperti di sicurezza

Auto-scans of phones would violate data privacy, say security experts

Leading cryptographers warn the proposed schemes to detect child abuse images are a form of mass surveillance Apple’s plans to install software on American iPhones to scan continuously for child abuse imagery have been delayed

FINANCIAL TIMES - Madhumita Murgia in London 15th of October 2021 


A group of world-leading cryptography and security experts has warned that scanning images on smartphones, like a scheme proposed by Apple in August, should be treated like mass surveillance and prohibited by law. “[Device scanning] makes what was formerly private on a user’s device potentially available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, even in the absence of a warrant,” said the authors, who include Whitfield Diffie, an inventor of public key cryptography, Ronald Rivest, an inventor of the widely used RSA encryption system, and firewall expert Steven Bellovin.
“Because this privacy violation is performed at the scale of entire populations, it is a bulk surveillance technology,” they added. The researchers raised the alarm as calls to circumvent encryption from intelligence and law enforcement agencies around the world become increasingly strident, with the EU due to propose a new law on child protection that may include suggestions for device scanning in December.

It also follows now-delayed plans by Apple to install software on American iPhones to scan continuously for child abuse imagery. Such an automated system would proactively alert a team of human reviewers who would then contact law enforcement, if they believe illegal imagery is detected. Apple halted plans to launch the software after a fierce backlash from privacy campaigners and other tech companies.
“The concern is that European institutions could bring in a law making something like Apple’s child abuse blocking proposal mandatory for people providing phones and chat apps,” said Ross Anderson, a co-author of the paper, titled “Bugs In Our Pockets”, and a professor of security engineering at the University of Cambridge. “Interfering with the security of people’s devices by making them intrinsically easy to wiretap, putting in government-mandated snooping software that will look at your pictures, texts and videos to see if there is anything the government doesn’t like, really does cross a red line.”

Scanning a user’s device, known as “client-side scanning”, has been proposed by governments as a way to identify unlawful content — including child abuse and terrorism — on a person’s phone, while nominally preserving end-to-end encryption. “But unfortunately it’s not that simple...client-side scanning would render the user privacy and security guarantees of encryption hollow,” wrote Erica Portnoy, senior technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Even a well-intentioned effort to build such a system will...open the door to broader abuses.”
Scanning stored data on a user’s device “brings surveillance to a new level”, Anderson and his colleagues write, adding that promises by companies like Apple that its use would be limited to child abuse imagery is “illusory”. 

In 2016, Apple went to court with the FBI, defending its use of encryption when pressured by the authorities to access a terror suspect’s iPhone following a shooting in San Bernardino, California. The researchers said that the proposal to pre-emptively scan all user devices for targeted content was “far more insidious” than the FBI asking for specific access to an individual’s device.
They said: “The [intelligence] agencies’ direction of travel is the bulk scanning of everyone’s private data, all the time, without warrant or suspicion. Is it prudent to deploy extremely powerful surveillance technology that could easily be extended to undermine basic freedoms?”